The Comparison: Bossism in Thailand and The Philippines
Every modern state commands 'public' agencies, resources, and regulatory powers that may be appropriated for 'private' gain. The formal rules governing the distinction between 'public' and 'private' interests (and their violation or manipulation) serve as the basis for what is commonly identified as 'corruption'. Yet 'corruption' is a phenomenon notoriously difficult to document, to quantify, and thus to compare systematically over time or across cases. Where the structure of 'corruption' manifests itself in publicly visible and enduring forms of monopoly, however, greater clarity is possible.
Thus, in the case of Indonesia, for example, scholars have amply documented, sector by sector, the monopolistic control over the 'commanding heights' of the economy secured by cronies and children of long-time president Suharto, thus highlighting the 'neo-patrimonial' features of his regime.
In formally democratic regimes, moreover, the entrenchment of numerous local 'bosses' provides an analogous form of monopoly, which, however localized, may be similarly chronicled in newspaper articles, court cases, election records, other public documents, and provincial histories. Hence the considerable scholarly literature on county court house cliques and urban machines in the United States, mafia in southern Italy, caciques in Latin America.
This essay seeks to identify the political context of corruption in Thailand and the Philippines by tracing the emergence of a social formation in which virtual monopolies over coercive and economic resources within territorially defined bailiwicks are secured and maintained by local 'bosses'. Through a comparative historical analysis of state formation in South East Asia, the essay illustrates the centrality of 'democratization' -the subordination of the state apparatus to elected officials -in facilitating the growth of 'bossism' in Thailand and the Philippines, and not elsewhere in the region. Through a comparative sociological analysis of state and institutional structures, moreover, the essay highlights those factors that best explain variation in the manifestations of bossism seen across cases and over time.
In a region well known for its diversity of linguistic and cultural influences, 'Great Tradition' religions, colonial experiences, ethnic and class configurations, and state and institutional structures, Thailand and the Philippines stand out as particularly unlikely and unpromising candidates for cross-national comparative analysis. Despite their many differences in terms of historical experience and socio-political configuration, however, they share a set of important commonalities that make them distinctive in the South East Asian context and make a 'paired comparison' plausible and promising. First of all, in the era of high colonialism (c. 1850-1940) In this context, the institutional constraints upon embryonic manifestations of local bossism were significant. The steady growth of rice cultivation provided ample opportunities for capital accumulation through control over the expanding circuitries of production and distribution, and a provincial eco- 'purchase' of their discretionary and regulatory powers over the local economy Yet these local government officials were only available, as it were, for temporary rent rather than permanent sale, and at prices to a considerable extent dictated by competitive bidding, as decisions with regard to appointment, promotion, removal, and transfer were made by Bangkok-based bureaucrats rather than upcountry bosses. At the national level, an analogous pattern persisted, with the dominant banking empires obliged to include ranking army generals on their boards of directors, and the syndicates For scholarly accounts, see Anderson, Ockey 1992; Phongpaichit et al. 1994 and Turton 1989. 58 running the opium and heroin trade operated by rival cliques within the military establishment.
By the 1970s, however, three interrelated (and welldocumented') changes had begun to expand the domain for local bossism in Thailand. First of all, a pattern of steady economic growth, stimulated in no small part by the American-sponsored Vietnam War boom in the country, greatly expanded and multiplied the activities, resources, and external linkages of provincial elites in the Thai countryside. Owners of paddy fields and rice mills rechannelled capital into gasoline stations and ice plants, mining claims and logging concessions, construction companies and real-estate firms, and shifted energies into cultivating Bangkok-based banks for loans and district-and province-level bureaucrats for building permits, land titles, public works contracts, zoning ordinances, and various concessions, franchises, and regulatory breaks. Second, with the growth of armed revolutionary movements in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia and the emergence of peasantbased organizations and mobilizational efforts in some areas of the Thai countryside, the government in Bangkok initiated a counterinsurgency campaign that entailed both the infusion of considerable state funds for 'rural development' and the creation of local paramilitary organizations in rural communities. These intertwined processes broadened the scope and volume of resource flows and state-based prerogatives available to provincial businessmen in rural Thailand.
Third, the social forces generated by the Vietnam War boom began to combine with the internal contradictions of army rule to shift the locus of Against this backdrop, by the mid-1980s observers of Thai politics had begun to comment on the growing manifestations of local bossism, most prominently with reference to what have come to be known as chao pho (orjao poh), Thai 'godfathers' of a distinctly mafioso variety (Ockey 1993) . These chao pho are identifiable through their interrelated activities in three realms. First, they are visible through the multiplicity and monopolistic quality of their economic activities within loosely defined territorial bailiwicks, in terms of accumulation of proprietary wealth (agricultural land, real-estate properties, mills, processing centres, factories; shares in banks and industrial firms), acquisition of state-derived concessions, contracts, and franchises (e.g. logging, mining, public works, transport), and involvement in illegal rackets (e.g. drug trade, gambling, smuggling). Second, chao pho have achieved great prominence and power through their successful service as -or provision of -vote brokers (hua khanaen) in elections, delivering parliamentary constituencies or regional clusters of constituencies to Bangkok-based patrons, local clients, or themselves on election day, through a combination of coercion, vote-buying, and electoral fraud. Third, chao pho have become notorious for their control over local state agencies, most notably the coercive apparatuses, and their ability to achieve effective local monopolies over the organization of (state and extra-state) violence within their bailiwicks, for use in capital accumulation, electoral manipulation, and enforcement of illegal rackets.
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Compared to the forms of local bossism observed elsewhere, the contemporary Thai variant is distinctive in two key respects. First, the transfer of effective control over the state apparatus to elected officials came relatively late vis-à-vis the process of capitalist development, with enormous Bangkokbased financial, agro-business, and industrial conglomerates and up-country magnates with province-or region-wide empires already entrenched and equipped with ample resources for electoral competition. Thus prominent Bangkok bankers and industrialists have themselves assumed political party leadership posts or otherwise engineered alliances with regional clusters of chao pho, and provincial businessmen have in some cases exercised chao pho-like influence over multiple constituencies or even provinces. Second, the subordination of the state apparatus to a parliament drawn from multiple-seat constituencies and without proportional representation has encouraged a highly fluid system of political parties held together largely by patronage networks (regional and national) and personal ties and coalition governments stitched together through multi-party Cabinets. Thus chao pho exercising control over several constituencies have found it relatively easy to install themselves or their stooges in Cabinet and thereby to wield considerable influence over the internal affairs of key central ministries and their local agents.
As suggested by the ascent of up-country construction magnate and provincial gangster-politician, Banharn Silpa-archa, to the premiership following the 1995 elections, the social and institutional constraints upon the power and influence of chao pho in contemporary Thailand are rather limited. The brief reassertion in 199 1-92 of military prerogatives was relatively diffident and ultimately disastrous, proving that the social costs of a full-blown authoritarian relapse are simply no longer sustainable in Thailand. Whilst a handful of former army officers have made the transition to civilian political careers and secured parliamentary and even cabinet seats, the military establishment itself today enjoys only limited institutional autonomy from parliament and limited economic relevance for businessmen. Labour unions, peasant groups and non-government organizations command very little electoral influence, and election-monitoring efforts by a group known as Poll Watch to curb vote-buying, violence, and electoral fraud do not appear to have seriously disrupted chao pho methods for mobilizing rural Thai voters. Meanwhile, the much vaunted urban middle-class reformism' of the Bangkokbased Palang Dharma party has evidently fallen victim to the realities of parliamentary coalitionmaking and campaign financing, as signalled by the assumption of party leadership by a prominent business tycoon.
In this context, the most effective and important constraints upon chao pho influence and activities appear to be those exercised by individual Bangkok-based and foreign capitalists and by the structural logic of capitalist development. As various (Bangkok-based and foreign) conglomerates have extended direct control over the production and distribution of goods and services to the provinces, chao pho methods of electoral mobilization will accordingly grow more costly and face greater challenges. Such is the promise of 'democratization', but for the foreseeable future chao pho will retain if not the premiership then at least a considerable share of seats in parliament, control over the Cabinet, and discretion over the agencies and resources of the state apparatus. In classic American style, and under the rubric of rapid 'Filipinization', these elected Filipino officials enjoyed enormous discretion over the emerging state apparatus. Elected municipal mayors retained their Spanish-era discretionary powers over local law-enforcement, public works, and taxation, wïn-ning complete independence from parish priests and full authority to appoint municipal police forces. Whilst elected governors enjoyed somewhat similar law-enforcement and taxation powers at the provincial level, representatives to the national legislature gained control over a hastily constructed and rapidly 'Filipinized' national state apparatus. Within their own districts, legislators exercised effective discretion over the disbursement of 'pork barrel' funds for public works and the appointment of constabulary commanders, district engineers and superintendents of schools, provincial fiscals, treasurers, and assessors, judges of the court of first instance, and local agents of the Bureau of Lands. In Manila, meanwhile, these legislators likewise exerted influence over the awarding of contracts, concessions, and monopoly franchises, the appointment of officials in national government agencies, and the allocation of loans by the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Finally, with the election of a Commonwealth president in 1935, a (directly elected) national executive took office, assuming powers in domestic affairs far greater than those of his American counterpart.
Following Philippine independence in 1946, the continued subordination of the agencies of the national state apparatus to this multi-tiered hierarchy of elected officials combined with the ongoing process of 'primitive accumulation' and the expanding economic role of the Philippine state with import-substitution industrialization to facilitate the emergence and entrenchment of bosses in numerous localities and at various levels of state power. The frequency of elections and the overlapping and conflicting prerogatives of municipal, provincial, and congressional authorities have guaranteed continuous dynamism and exerted competitive pressure upon aspiring powerbrokers, yet bosses have been able to construct and through persistent electoral victories retain personal fiefdoms through the accumulation of economic and coercive resources within a given bailiwick. In some localities, a concentration of land or other forms of proprietary wealth has facilitated the entrenchment of dynasties over successive generations; in others, the extent of state control over the 'commanding heights' of the local economy has permitted long-term rule by a single boss but thwarted efforts at dynasty-building.
In still other localities, boss rule has entailed the delivery of 'brokerage' services to a cartel of local business magnates. Throughout, the key to boss rule has lain in the accumulation and retention of a preponderant share of the key resources for local electoral success: a retinue of loyal personal followers, large quantities of money for buying votes and bribing election officials, and coercive resources to reinforce both personal and pecuniary considerations.
Thus bosses have succeeded in entrenching themselves in various localities throughout the archipelago and at all levels of state power. In countless small towns, claims to rice fields, coconut groves, and sugar plantations, control of agricultural credit, distribution, input, and processing networks, and command over municipal lands, mangroves, and fishing grounds, law-enforcement, patronage, public works, and rackets have combined to sustain the electoral and economic fortunes of numerous perennial mayors. At the congressional district and provincial levels, long-time congressmen and governors have relied more heavily on state office to control 'nodal' economic choke-points and key natural resources: sugar centrals and cement factories built up with PNB behest loans, electricity and transportation companies awarded franchises, construction and real-estate firms offered preference in contract bidding and zoning ordinances, logging and mining concessions provided on public lands. With municipal and provincial law-enforcement agencies subordinated to mayoral and gubernatorial control, moreover, 'provincial warlords' have enjoyed control over so-called 'private armies' as well as lucrative rackets in gambling, smuggling, and other illegal activities.
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Whilst bosses have flourished in numerous municipalities, congressional districts, and provinces, the distinctive institutional structures of the Philippine state and the pattern of private capital formation in the archipelago have obstructed the ascension of boss rule to the national (i.e. presidential) level. Alongside the American-style single-district/singlerepresentative House of Representatives, the bicameral national legislature has included a Senate whose 24 members are elected on a nation-wide basis. With its manifold patronage powers enshrined in the Constitution and its 24 members proven in the national electoral arena, the Senate has often served as an effective Trojan horse and launching pad for anti-administration opposition forces and campaigns against the re-election bids of presidential incumbents, thus preventing the entrenchment of national bosses. Furthermore, the national oligarchy has reinforced this pattern of factional competition for the presidency and thwarted national state-based monopoly, by providing generous funding to opposition candidates and preventing the 'commanding heights' of the national economy from falling into the hands of a single boss.
In the only case of national-level boss rule, longtime president Ferdinand Marcos overcame these obstacles under national conditions roughly analogous to those which have allowed bosses to entrench themselves at the local level. In the mid-1960s, the increasing availability of foreign loans and assistance programmes, necessity for national state intervention in 'development', and dependence of the oligarchy on government loans and special incentives allowed Marcos in his first term to extend presidential prerogatives to unprecedented supervisory powers over national law-enforcement and military agencies and unparalleled regulatory powers over the national economy Benefiting also from the importance of forth by decree, Marcos centralized a national police under the Armed Forces, established quasi-governmental monopolies for major commodity exports, and parcelled out regulatory and proprietary control over the other 'commanding heights' of the national economy -banking, construction, energy, media, ports, telecommunications and transportation -among a close circle of family members, cronies, and froritmen. Only in the mid-1980s, when the world recession and the ensuing domestic financial crisis led to government bankruptcy and threatened American withdrawal of support, did Marcos' national boss rule begin to unravel. Overly reliant on office-based resources and unable to establish a firm economic base independent of the state, Marcos, like many small-town and provincial bosses, was unable to withstand the hostile intervention of a superordinate power (i.e. the U.S.) and to pass on his bailiwick to successive generations in classic dynasty form.
Since the fall of Marcos in 1986 and the subsequent reestablishment of regular, competitive local, congressional and presidential elections in the Philippines, the process commonly known as 'democratization' has seen the reflowering of local bossism throughout the archipelago. Pork barrel and patronage appointments have, to a large extent, reverted to congressional hands, a Philippine National Police firmly subordinated to legislative and local executive authority has replaced the Marcos-era Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police, and a new local government code has restored -and indeed strengthened -the prerogatives of municipal mayors and provincial governors over local agencies and resources of the state apparatus. Given the manifold spoils of these multitudinous offices, elections have been fiercely contested, through machine mobilization, vote-buying, fraud, manipulation, and violence. Small wonder that much recent journalistic and scholarly research has focused on 'bosses', 'political clans', 'dynasties', and 'warlords'.
Meanwhile, however, significant changes are clearly observable in the post-Marcos manifestations of bossism in the Philippines. New election laws, for example, have eliminated the pre-martial law inclusion of two political parties in the vote-counting process, thereby upsetting the established pattern of two-party competition (characteristic of presidentialism) and undermining party alignments and loyalties in general. Political parties are thus institutionally far weaker today in the Philippines than they were in the 1950s or 1960s. At the national level, moreover, the withdrawal of
Conclusion
As the preceding analysis has suggested, one of the primary consequences of 'democratization' in Thailand and the Philippines since the mid-1980s has been the re-flowering of 'bossism in numerous localities in these two countries. The common manifestations of bossism in Thailand and the 'Philippines -the electoral and economic entrenchment of powerbrokers with virtually monopolistic control over entire localities -reflect a decisive change in the nature of their states, namely the subordination of their apparatuses to elected officials, rather than essential features of these two very different societies as the conventional wisdom on 'local strongmen' would have us believe (Migdal 1988) . Elsewhere in South East Asia, centralized single-party machines (e.g. UMNO in Malaysia) and military apparatuses (e.g. ABRI in Indonesia) have encapsulated local gangsters and magnates within sharply delimited realms of influence and power. We have shown how the differing institutional structure of the state and timing of 'democratization' vis-ä-vis capitalist development have accounted for the peculiar variations of bossism found in Thailand and the Philippines, namely reg(on-wide chao pho and gangster-banker clusterings in parliament and cabinet in the first instance and a multi-tiered and overlapping hierarchy of bosses with looser links to major conglomerates in the second.
As for projecting ongoing trends in Thailand and the Philippines into the foreseeable future, it is tempting to draw upon other examples of 'bossism' from elsewhere in the world. Certainly today's labour activists, NGOs, election-watch movements and civil-service reformists in these two countries are reminiscent of analogous forces arrayed against bossism at other times and in other places, and the structural logic of global capitalism does tend to shift casinos and construction contracts from gangster to corporate hands. Yet 
